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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal requires us to consider
a bankruptcy debtor-in-possession’s ability
to invoke the discovery rule to toll the
statutes of limitations on the debtor’s
claims arising out of its lawyer’s
embezzlement of estate funds.
The
bankruptcy and district courts here found
that despite the lawyer’s embezzlement
and non-disclosure of such embezzlement
to his client, the debtor, the debtor could
not, as a matter of law, establish that it
acted with reasonable diligence in ferreting
out the embezzlement that formed the
basis of its causes of action.

Richard L. Hahn
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Attorney for Appellee,
Richard L. Hahn

Arthur W. Lefco (Argued)
Marshall, Dennehey, Warner,
Coleman & Goggin
1845 Walnut Street, 16 th Floor
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Attorney for Appellee,
Jerome J. Verlin
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Because we believe that the
decisions below establish a policy that
fosters lawyers’ abuse of their fiduciary
relationships with their clients, and fail
adequately to protect the justifiable
reliance of clients on their lawyers’ probity
and trustworthiness, we will reverse and
remand for further proceedings concerning
the applicability of the discovery rule to
the debtor’s claims against its lawyer’s law
firm and the law firm’s individual
shareholders. We will affirm the grant of
summary judgment in Continental Bank’s
favor, however, on the alternative ground
that Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fiduciaries
Act, which immunizes banks from liability
arising out of good faith transfers of funds,
shields Continental from liability because
it transferred the eventually embezzled
funds in good faith to an authorized
recipient, the debtor’s lawyer. We will
also affirm the grant of summary judgment
in favor of Continental and the debtor’s
law firm on the breach of fiduciary duty
claims under ERISA.

“Appellants”), instituted claims in two
adversary proceedings against Continental
Bank,1 Pincus, Verlin, Hahn & Reich, P.C.
(“PVHR”) 2 (the law firm with which Ganz
was a partner), and various of PVHR’s
i n d i v id u a l s h a r e h o l d er l a w y e rs
( c o l le c t i v e l y “ D e f e n d a n t s ” a n d
“Appellees”), seeking to hold them liable
for the consequences of Ganz’s
embezzlement.
MTC and its related subsidiaries
and entities filed petitions under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 24,
1985. The bankruptcy court ordered that
the petitions of the related entities be
jointly administered. By virtue of the
Chapter 11 petitions, Mushroom became
the debtor-in-possession, and remained
such until December 1990, when the
bankruptcy was converted to a Chapter 7
proceeding. The events relevant to this
appeal occurred during the Chapter 11

I. Background

1

PNC Bank, N.A., Continental’s
successor, advocates C ontinen tal’s
position in this appeal. Because the events
in question occurred prior to the
succession, we will refer to the bank
defendant as Continental throughout this
opinion.

The claims in this appeal arise out
of the embezzlement of funds belonging to
the bankruptcy estates of Mushroom
Transportation Company, Inc. (“MTC”)
and related debtor companies, Robbey
Realty, Inc., Penn York Realty Company,
Inc., Trux Enterprises, Inc. and Leazit, Inc.
(collectively “Mushroom”) by Jonathan
Ganz, legal counsel to the bankruptcy
estates. Mushroom, through its trustee,
and various pension plans and their
adm inistrators (the “Pension Plan
Plaintiffs”) (together with the trustee,

2

Mushroom also brought suit
against a number of additional law firms
who are successors of PVHR. Because the
identities of these additional firms are
immaterial to our resolution of this appeal,
we will refer only to PVHR as the law firm
defendant.
4

bankruptcy, prior to the Chapter 7
conversion.

Arnold anticipated a “further reduction” in
his (Arnold’s) involvement in the
bankruptcy proceedings by March of 1987.
Ganz responded to Arnold’s letter by
correspondence dated February 17, 1987,
which stated that Continental held
approximately $986,000 “in various
escrow accounts,” and that PVHR held
additional funds for the final real estate
settlements in “escrow accounts.”

Mushroom retained the services of
PVHR, through Ganz, to provide legal
representation during the course of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
Within six
months of the filing of the Chapter 11
petitions, Mushroom ceased operations
and began to liquidate assets. On February
27, 1986, the bankruptcy court appointed
Michael C. Arnold, MTC’s executive vice
presid ent, “Special Liq uidatio n
Consultant” to assist in the liquidation, and
Mushroom proceeded under his leadership
to liquidate a significant portion of assets.

In June 1987, Continental and
PVHR, as counsel to Mushroom, entered
into a bankruptcy court-approved payment
stipulation (the “Stipulation”), which Ganz
signed on behalf of PVHR as “Counsel to
Debtors.” The Stipulation provided for the
repayment of the balance of the debt owed
to Continental from the funds held in the
escrow account at Continental. Once
Mu shro om satisfied its debt t o
Continental, the Stipulation required
Continental to turn over any remaining
funds in the escrow account to PVHR, “to
be held in escrow for the benefit of the
Debtor’s estate... . ” In September 1987, at
Ganz’s urging, the bankruptcy court
excused Mushroom from the statutory
requirement to file monthly operating
statements.

Mushroom allocated a large
percentage of the liquidation proceeds to
satisfying a substantial debt owed to
Continental, a secured creditor who held a
perfected security interest in all of
Mushroom’s assets. On June 16, 1986,
following repayment of some of the debt
to Continental, the bankruptcy court, with
the consent of the parties, authorized the
opening of an escrow account at
Continental to hold the balance of
proceeds generated from the sale of
Mushroom’s assets not yet paid to
Continental.

Pursuant to the Stipulation, and
following satisfaction of the debt owed to
it, Continental issued a $200,000
treasurer’s check dated July 21, 1987,
payable to Ganz, “Council [sic] for Debtor
in Possession.” On August 3, 1987,
Continental deposited the remaining
$766,624.49 balance into an escrow
account at Continental that had been
opened by Ganz under the name of MTC,

In a letter to Ganz dated February
12, 1987, Arnold informed Ganz that he
(Arnold) and Robert B. Cutaiar, MTC’s
president, were handling the day-to-day
operations of the debtors. The letter
requested an accounting of the proceeds of
one of Mushroom’s realty sales and a
report of Mushroom’s assets held by
Continental, and informed Ganz that

5

with Jonathan Ganz, c/o PVHR, as escrow
agent for Mushroom.

about the amount and location of the
funds.

Between August 3, 1987 and April
26, 1988, Ganz misappropriated more than
one-half million dollars of the transferred
funds.
In the interim, Arnold had
contacted Ganz on several occasions
inquiring about the transferred funds. In
late 1987 or early 1988, Arnold requested
from Ganz an accounting of the
Mushroom estate’s assets.
Ganz
responded by sending Arnold a copy of the
Stipulation in a February 2, 1988,
correspondence.
Arnold replied on
February 19, 1988, writing that Ganz’s
response – merely sending a copy of the
Stipulation – “[did] not clear up the
problem of how much is being held and by
whom.” Arnold’s correspondence also set
forth his estimates of the assets remaining
based on Mushroom’s records and other
numbers, and asked Ganz to confirm the
numbers.

In January 1992, the bankruptcy
court approved the subs tantiv e
consolidation of MTC and its related
entities, at which time Arnold was
prepared to distribute the proceeds from
the sale of Mushroom’s assets. Arnold
called Ganz to request that Ganz start
liquidating the certificates of deposit and
escrow accounts he had said were held on
behalf of Mushroom by PVHR, but
received no response. At the end of
February 1992, the United States Trustee
advised Arnold that Ganz was reportedly
involved in the defalcation of other
bankruptcy estates he had served as legal
counsel. Acting upon this information,
Arnold subsequently learned that Ganz had
absconded with the Mushroom funds
under Ganz’s control.
II. The Adversary Actions
On October 5, 1992, Arnold, by
now the trustee (hereinafter the “Trustee”)3
following Mushroom’s conversion to
Chapter 7 bankruptcy, filed adversary
action no. 92-1043 (the “First Adversary
Action”) on behalf of Mushroom against
Ganz and PVHR. Arnold later moved to
amend his complaint to add Continental as
a defendant; the bankruptcy court granted
the motion, but refused to relate the
amendment back to the date of the original

There appears to have been some
oral communication between Arnold and
Ganz following the February 19, 1988,
correspondence in which Ganz assured
Arnold “that the assets were invested in
passbook certificates of deposit at various
banks... .” Ganz testified that in this
communication, he told Arnold that “there
were funds in an approximate amount – I
wouldn’t recall the exact number – and
they were in CDs and we were holding
them. I was holding them.”
It is
undisputed that Arnold failed to request
written confirmation of, or otherwise
attempt to verify, Ganz’s representations

3

Arnold resigned as trustee on
January 23, 1995, and was replaced by the
current trustee, Jeoffrey Burtch, on March
15, 1995.
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complaint. The bankruptcy court also
denied Arnold’s motion to add PVHR’s
individual shareholders as defendants, and
refused to allow the Pension Plan Plaintiffs
to join the action as plaintiffs.4 Arnold,
joined by the Pension Plan Plaintiffs who
had been prohibited from joining as
plaintiffs in the First Adversary Action,
filed a second adversary action, no. 940003 (the “Second Adversary Action”), on
January 3, 1994.

assets); and Count VIII (by the Trustee and
Pension Plan Plaintiffs against PVHR and
Continental, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty under § 1109(a) of ERISA as
custodians of plan assets).
Defendants moved for summary
judgment on all counts in both adversary
actions. Defendants argued that all of the
claims were barred by the applicable
statutes of limitations and laches, and
Continental and PVHR argued that the
ERISA claim was legally insufficient
because neither was a fiduciary within the
meaning of the relevant ERISA provision,
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).

Together, the virtually identical
complaints in the two adversary actions
advanced eight claims against Ganz,
PVHR, PVHR’s individual shareholders,
and Continental, seven5 of which are the
subject of this appeal: Count I (by the
Trustee against PVHR and Ganz, seeking
turnover of estate property); Count II (by
the Trustee against PVHR, alleging breach
of fiduciary duty as escrow agent); Counts
III and V (by the Trustee against
Continental, alleging breach of fiduciary
duty for releasing property to Ganz, and
wrongful conversion of estate property);
Count VI (by the Trustee against PVHR
and Continental, alleging breach of
contract for violating the Stipulation);
Count VII (by the Trustee against PVHR’s
individual shareholders, alleging negligent
failure to ensure preservation of client

In separate opinions dated August
24, 1998 and October 1, 1999, the
bankruptcy court granted summary
judgment in favor of all Defendants. The
bankruptcy court found that the applicable
statutes of limitations and laches principles
under Pennsylvania law barred the
Trustee’s turnover and common law
claims, and that Mushroom had failed to
e xe rcise re a sona ble dilige nc e in
uncovering these claims so as to toll the
statutes of limitations and preclude laches.
Moreover, the bankruptcy court concluded,
neither Continental nor PVHR were
fiduciaries susceptible to suit under
ERISA.
On appeal, the district court
affirmed on essentially the same bases
relied upon by the bankruptcy court.

4

Arnold filed the amended
complaint in the First Adversary Action on
May 27, 1994.
5

Count IV, raising a conversion
claim against Ganz only, is not at issue in
this appeal.
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III. Appellate Jurisdiction

intention to appeal the unspecified order is
apparent and the opposing party is not
prejudiced and has a full opportunity to
brief the issues.” Id. (citation omitted). In
determining whether a notice encompasses
an unspecified order, we follow a “policy
of liberal construction of notices of appeal
... where the intent to appeal an
unmentioned or mislabeled ruling is
apparent and there is no prejudice to the
adverse party.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 202 n. 1 (3d Cir.
2001) (citations omitted).

Continental suggests that we lack
appellate jurisdiction over the district
court’s disposition of Appellants’ appeal in
the Second Adversary Action because
Appellants failed to specify in their notice
the district court’s order supposedly
disposing of the Second Adversary Action.
There is no question that Appellants’
notice of appeal does not unmistakably
indicate an intention to appeal from both
of the district court’s orders affirming the
bankruptcy court’s disposition of the two
adversary actions. The notice specifies
only the district court’s order dated
September 4, 2002, and entered by the
clerk on September 5, 2002, which
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s August
1998 order; the notice fails to specify the
district court’s order dated September 4,
2002, and entered by the clerk on
September 6, 2002, which affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s October 1999 order.

Despite the notice’s failure to
specify the order entered September 6, we
will exercise appellate jurisdiction over
both orders for several reasons. First, the
caption of the notice references the
bankruptcy court docket numbers for both
adversary actions, reflecting an intent to
appeal the district court’s disposition of
the bankruptcy court’s rulings in both
actions. Moreover, the body of the notice
identifies all plaintiffs and defendants in
both of the adversary actions as Appellants
and Appellees, respectively. Because the
claims in both adversary actions are
virtually identical, and were disposed of by
the district court based on the same
reasoning, Appellees cannot contend that
they are prejudiced by having to address an
appeal concerning the district court’s order
entered September 6.

“When an appeal is taken from a
specified judgment only or from a part of
a specified judgment, the court of appeals
acquires thereby no jurisdiction to review
other judgments or portions thereof not so
specified or otherwise fairly to be inferred
from the notice as intended to be presented
for review on the appeal.” Lusardi v.
Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir.
1992) (quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d
Cir. 1977)).
But we may exercise
appellate jurisdiction over an order not
specified in a notice of appeal where
“there is a connection between the
specified and unspecified order, the

Guided by our “liberal policy” in
construing notices of appeal, we conclude
that the notice of appeal adequately
communicates Appellants’ intent to appeal
the district court’s order entered
September 6, and find no prejudice to
8

Appellees from an exercise of our
jurisdiction over that order. We will
therefore exercise appellate jurisdiction
over both of the district court’s orders
entered in this matter.

even if the claims were federal, state law
would supply the applicable statutes of
limitations pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s directive that “when Congress has
failed to provide a statute of limitations for
a federal cause of action, a court ‘borrows’
or ‘absorbs’ the local time limitation most
analogous to the case at hand.” Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355 (1991)
(citations omitted).
This borrowing
principle applies equally to federal
common law actions. Oneida County,
N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York State, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985).
Along with state statutes of limitations, a
borrowing court “must also borrow from
state law the relevant tolling principles.”
Island Insteel Systems, Inc. v. Waters, 296
F.3d 200, 210 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).

IV. Standards of Review
We apply plenary review to a
district court’s grant of summary judgment
and assess the record using the same
standards for summary judgment employed
by the district court. Farrell v. Planters
Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir.
2000) (citation omitted).
Summary
judgment is appropriate where the moving
party can demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
We must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-movant,
“draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.” Fields v.
Thompson Printing Co., Inc., 363 F.3d
259, 265 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

The Court in Oneida Indian Nation
pointed out that borrowing would be
impermissible where the borrowed state
limitations period interfered with federal
policies. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
at 240. See also Island Insteel Systems,
Inc., 296 F.3d at 207 (“if borrowing an
analogous statute of limitations from state
law would ‘frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies,’
courts must look to federal law for an
analogous limitations period”) (citations
omitted). The Trustee directs us to no
authority suggesting that application of
state statutes of limitations to the common
law claims here – common law claims
asserted post-bankruptcy petition and
based on post-petition wrongdoing –

V. Discussion
A.

What law supplies the statutes of
limitations applicable to the
common law claims?

As a preliminary matter, the Trustee
submits that because the estate’s claims
arise out of the wrongful transfer and
subsequent embezzlement of a bankruptcy
estate’s escrowed funds, they are governed
by a federal common law of bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court noted that whether
or not the Trustee’s claims were state or
federal in nature was unimportant because

9

frustrates any national policy in effecting
the administration and reorganization of a
bankruptcy estate. To the contrary, the
Bankruptcy Code itself imposes a two-year
limitations period on post-petition claims
seeking to avoid post-petition transfers of
property of the bankruptcy estate. See 11
U.S.C. § 549(d). Thus, the suggestion that
imposing state-law limitations periods of
two or more years on common law claims
asserted post-petition, and based on postpetition misconduct, interferes with federal
bankruptcy principles – where the
Bankruptcy Code itself imposes a two-year
limitations period on certain post-petition
claims based on post-petition misconduct
– is simply without merit. We therefore
agree with the bankruptcy and district
courts that state law, specifically
Pennsylvania law,6 supplies the statutes of
limitations applicable to the Trustee’s
common law claims.
B.

statutes of limitations, we must assess the
accuracy of those which they applied. In
short, the bankruptcy and district courts
correctly held that various two-year
statutes of limitations governed Counts II
and III (breach of fiduciary duty), V
(wrongful conve rsion) and V II
(negligence) in each adversary proceeding,
and that a four-year statute of limitations
period governed Count VI (breach of
contract). 7 Maillie v. Greater Delaware

7

The bankruptcy and district courts
also correctly concluded that the ERISA
breach of fiduciary duty claim in Count
VIII was subject to the six-year statute of
limitations set forth in 29 U.S.C. §
1113(1). Neither court found that the
statute had run on this claim. There is no
question that the statute of limitations had
not yet expired as to the ERISA claim
against PVHR, as it was set forth in the
original complaint filed in 1992. It is not
so clear, however, whether the statute of
limitations had run on the ERISA claim
against Continental, which was first
advanced in the amended complaint filed
on May 27, 1994. Since the bankruptcy
court refused to relate the claims against
Continental back to the date of the original
complaint, there is an argument that the
six-year limitations period applicable to
the ERISA claim had expired by the date
of the filing of the amended complaint.
Because we agree with the bankruptcy and
district courts that neither PVHR nor
Continental are fiduciaries subject to suit
under 29 U.S.C. § 1109, we need not
resolve whether the statute of limitations

The applicable statutes of
limitations and laches principles

Having determined that the
bankruptcy and district courts correctly
chose to apply (or borrow) Pennsylvania’s

6

Given that Pennsylvania is the
forum state, and has the most extensive
contacts with the litigants and the facts at
issue in this litigation, it is the proper
source of the applicable statutes of
limitations and laches principles. Gluck v.
Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1179-80 (3d
Cir. 1992) (applying general rule that
statute of limitations should be borrowed
from forum state).
10

Valley Health Care, Inc., 628 A.2d 528,
532 (Pa. Commw. 1993) (breach of
fiduciary duty); Bednar v. Marino, 646
A.2d 573, 578 (Pa. Super. 1994)
(conversion); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(2)
(citation omitted) (negligence); 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a) (breach of contract).

The Bankruptcy Code does not impose a
statute of limitations on turnover claims
arising under these provisions. In re
Midway Airlines, Inc., 221 B.R. 411, 458
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Bankruptcy Code
does not contain a statute of limitations for
turnover actions pursuant to § 542”); In re
Bookout Holsteins, Inc., 100 B.R. 427,
432 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (same); In re
De Berry, 59 B.R. 891, 898 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same). Because turnover
claims are equitable in nature, see Walker
v. Weese, 286 B.R. 294, 299 (D. Md.
2002) (turnover claim “fairly characterized
as an equitable claim”); In re Warmus, 252
B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000)
(turnover claims, “firmly rooted in
protecting and preserving property of the
[estate], ... are clearly and uniquely
equitable claims under the Bankruptcy
Code”) (citations omitted); In re Kabler,
230 B.R. 525, 526 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999)
(“Turnover is an equitable remedy”), they
are subject to laches. Algrant v. Evergreen
Valley Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 126
F.3d 178, 186 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1997) (“An
action brought in equity is governed by the
doctrine of laches.”) (citing Russell v.
Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940)). See also
Erkins v. Bryan, 785 F.2d 1538, 1543
(11th Cir. 1986) (“Policies underlying the
creation of federal equitable claims are not

The bankruptcy and district courts
also correctly determined the laches
principles governing the turnover claim.
The turnover claim set forth in Count I
arises under 11 U.S.C. §§ 542 and 543.8

bars Appellants’ ERISA claim against
Continental.
8

11 U.S.C. § 542(a) provides that:

Except as provided in subsection
(c) or (d) of this section, an entity,
other than a cus tod ian, in
possession, custody, or control,
during the case, of property that the
trustee may use, sell, or lease under
section 363 of this title, or that the
debtor may exempt under section
522 of this title, shall deliver to the
trustee, and account for, such
property or the value of such
property, unless such property is of
inconsequential value or benefit to
the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 543(b)(1) provides that:
(b)

or profits of such property, that is
in such custodian’s possession,
custody, or control on the date that
such custodian acquires knowledge
of the commencement of the case[.]

A custodian shall–

(1)
deliver to the trustee any
property of the debtor held by or
transferred to such custodian, or
proceeds, product, offspring, rents,
11

well served by applying rigid limitations;
therefore, federal courts considering
federal equitable claims should rely on
equitable principles.”) (citing Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)).

estate property. Section 549(a) claims are
subject to § 549(d), which provides that §
549(a) claims “may not be commenced
after the earlier of – (1) two years after the
date of the transfer sought to be avoided;
or (2) the time the case is closed or
dismissed.” 11 U.S.C. § 549(d). The
Trustee’s turnover claim targets a postpetition transfer of funds by Continental to
Ganz. Section 549(a) expressly creates a
cause of action by which to seek avoidance
of post-petition transfers, a cause of action
clearly analogous to the turnover claim
here. Consequently, Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. dictates that we consult the
statute of limitations applicable to a §
549(a) claim – the two-year period set
forth in § 549(d) – in determining whether
to shift to the Trustee the burden of
proving excusable delay and the absence
of prejudice.

“The party asserting laches as a
defensive bar must establish (1) an
inexcusable delay in bringing the action
and (2) prejudice.” United States Fire Ins.
Co. v. Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201,
208 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
“To establish prejudice, the party raising
laches must demonstrate that the delay
caused a disadvantage in asserting and
establishing a claimed right or defense; the
mere loss of what one would have
otherwise kept does not establish
prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted). While
statutes of limitations do not directly apply
to equitable claims such as the turnover
claim, a limitations period on an analogous
claim for legal relief is highly relevant to a
laches analysis. As we said in E.E.O.C. v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 735 F.2d
69 (3d Cir. 1984), “[i]f a statutory
limitations period that would bar legal
relief has expired, then the defendant in an
action for equitable relief enjoys the
benefit of a presumption of inexcusable
delay and prejudice. In that case, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to justify its
delay and negate prejudice.” 735 F.2d at
80 (citations omitted).

C.

Did Mushroom fail as a matter of
law to exercise reasonable
diligence in uncovering Ganz’s
embezzlement?

The bankruptcy and district courts
correctly found that, absent application of
tolling principles, the common law tort and
contract claims accrued no later than
August of 1987, when Continental
completed the transfer of funds to Ganz
per the Stipulation. The bankruptcy and
district courts further concluded correctly
that the limitations period on the claim at
law analogous to the turnover claim –
relevant to a laches analysis under Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. – began to run
no later than April 26, 1988, the date on

The bankruptcy and district courts
concluded that the claim at law analogous
to the Trustee’s turnover claim arises
under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), which creates a
cause of action in a trustee to avoid an
unauthorized post-petition transfer of
12

which Ganz completed his embezzlement
of the transferred funds.

January-February 1992, when Arnold and
Mushroom first discovered Ganz’s
defalcation of the funds. The bankruptcy
and district courts held that, as a matter of
law, Mushroom (through Arnold and
Cutaiar) failed to exercise due diligence in
superintending Ganz’s oversight of the
funds, and therefore could not invoke
either the discovery rule or equitable
tolling to preserve its claims against all
Defendants. For the reasons that follow,
we find that there are genuine issues of
material fact concerning Mushroom’s
reasonable diligence for the fact-finder to
determine.

The Trustee’s primary argument 9
against the application of the statutes of
limitations and laches is that the discovery
rule and/or equitable tolling suspended the
running of the statutes of limitations (and
thereby precluded the onset of laches) until

9

The Trustee also contends that
Continental and PVHR were trustees of an
express trust (the escrow bank account),
and that since causes of action against such
trustees do not accrue until the trust is
“repudiated,” the limitations periods
should not have begun to run until
November-December 1992, when Arnold
first made a demand on Ganz for tender of
estate property in the escrow account. The
district court correctly rejected this
contention. Pennsylvania law makes clear
that the key element in a trust is that the
trustee possesses legal title to property.
Schellentrager v. Tradesmens Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co., 88 A.2d 773, 774 (Pa. 1952).
None of the relevant documents (including
the Stipulation) reflects any intent to
convey title in Mushroom’s funds to
Continental or PVHR.
Rather, the
Stipulation rendered Continental and
PVHR escrow agents w ho, under
Pennsylvania law, did not acquire legal
title to Mushroom’s funds.
Paul v.
Kennedy, 102 A.2d 158, 159 (Pa. 1954)
(under escrow arrangement, legal title
remains in a depositor until a condition
precedent is satisfied) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, this argument is without
merit.

Under Pennsylvania’s discovery
rule, the statute of limitations will not
begin to run until “the plaintiff reasonably
knows, or reasonably should know: (1)
that he has been injured, and (2) that his
injury has been caused by another party’s
conduct.” In re TMI Litig., 89 F.3d 1106,
1116 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Cathcart v.
Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493,
500 (Pa. Super. 1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The discovery rule will
only toll the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff shows that he or she has
exercised “‘reasonable diligence’ in
ascertaining the existence of the injury and
its cause.” Bohus v. Bellof, 950 F.2d 919,
925 (3d Cir. 1991).
Similarly, equitable tolling will
suspend the running of the statute of
limitations “(1) where the defendant has
actively misled the plaintiff respecting the
plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the
plaintiff in some extraordinary way has
been prevented from asserting his or her
13

rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely
asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the
wrong forum.”
Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380,
1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Like the discovery rule, equitable tolling
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “that
he or she could not, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, have discovered
essential information bearing on his or her
claim.” Id. at 1390 (citation omitted).

includes the “‘duty to protect and conserve
property in its possession for the benefit of
creditors.’” In re Marvel Entertainment
Grp., Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir.
1998) (citation omitted). Thus, there is no
question that Mushroom, acting through its
representatives Arnold and Cutaiar, had a
fiduciary duty to protect and maximize the
estate’s assets.
This duty formed the foundation for
the bankruptcy and district courts’
reasonable diligence analysis. Indeed, the
bankruptcy and district courts essentially
equated the fiduciary duty to safeguard
assets with the duty of reasonable
diligence and, finding a breach of the
former, therefore found a breach of the
latter.
Moreover, the courts held,
Mushroom could not escape the statutory
fiduciary duty to protect and maximize by
delegating such duty to legal counsel,
where the delegation amounted to an
abdication of that duty. The district court
explained its distinction between
permissible delegation and impermissible
abdication:

In assessing the finding that
Mushroom failed as a matter of law to
exercise reasonable diligence for purposes
of the discovery rule and equitable tolling,
we are guided by the general rule that such
determinations are typically within the
jury’s province unless “the facts are so
clear that reasonable minds cannot
differ ... .” Melley v. Pioneer Bank, N.A.,
834 A.2d 1191, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(citation omitted). During the time of
Ganz’s defalcations, Mushroom was in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and was therefore
a debtor-in-possession. See 11 U.S.C. §
1101(1). As we recently pointed out, “[i]n
Chapter 11 cases where no trustee is
appointed, [11 U.S.C.] § 1107(a) provides
that the debtor-in-possession, i.e., the
debtor’s management, enjoys the powers
that would otherwise vest in the
bankruptcy trustee. Along with those
powers, of course, comes the trustee’s
fiduciary duty to maximize the value of the
bankruptcy estate.” Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp.
v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir.
2003) (en banc).
The debtor-inpossession’s fiduciary duty to maximize

Although delegation of duties is
o n e t h i n g , a b d i c a ti o n o f
responsibility is quite another. In
this case, the debtors not only
“delegated” to Ganz the duty to
collect the funds generated from the
sale of assets, deposit them into the
escrow account pursuant to an
order of the court, and transfer the
funds to the law firm account to be
maintained pending further order of
the Bankruptcy Court, but rather
they surrendered totally their
14

obligation to oversee the
liquidation of the estate or to
supervise, even in the most
relaxed fash ion, the
activities of a retained
professional.
The
Bankruptcy
Code
commands the debtor in
possession (or the trustee) to
be the captain of the debtor
ship. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108.
Wh ile the debto r in
possession may assign to
others specific duties, it may
not surrender the helm and
let the debtor ship sail under
someone else’s captaincy.

funds embezzled by Ganz. The district
court found that summary judgment in the
bank’s favor on the issue of reasonable
diligence and the statute of limitations was
inappropriate for several reasons. First,
the court noted, delegation of debtor duties
– including those performed, or intended
to be performed, by Ganz here – is
perfectly appropriate under, and indeed
encouraged by, the Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, “a reasonable debtor in
p o s s e s s io n w o u l d , i n ce r t a in
circumstances, entrust the care of liquid
assets to a court-appointed lawyer.” Id. at
403 (citation omitted). Therefore, “there is
no legal basis to conclude that the
delegation of core trustee duties to courtappointed counsel for the estate by a
debtor in possession is per se sufficient to
show that the debtors in possession failed
to exercise due diligence.” Id.

Burtch v. Ganz (In re Mushroom Transp.
Co., Inc.), 282 B.R. 805, 825 (E.D. Pa.
2002) (footnote omitted).
Because
Mushroom abdicated its statutory duty to
preserve the estate’s assets, the bankruptcy
and district courts held, it could not
possibly demonstrate reasonable diligence
for purposes of the discovery rule. Id.

The district court then reviewed the
record and found that “in light of the fact
that reliance on counsel is inherent in the
bankruptcy code, ... the bankruptcy court
invaded the province of the fact finder by
depreciating the evidence that could
persuade a trier of fact that a reasonable
person in the circumstances of the
Mushroom debtors in possession would
have relied on counsel and consequently
failed to discover the thefts by Ganz until
a later date.” Id. at 404. Several aspects
of the record led the court to this
conclusion. First, the distribution of estate
assets was not an issue from early 1986
through August 1988 (when Ganz had
completed his embezzlement) because the
bankruptcy proceedings were focused on

In Burtch v. Security Pacific Bank
Oregon (In re Mushroom Transp. Co.,
Inc.), 247 B.R. 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000), a
related case involving the same facts
respecting Ganz’s embezzlement and
Mushroom’s oversight, Judge Reed of the
District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania reached a conclusion on
reasonable diligence and the statute of
limitations directly contrary to the one
reached by the bankruptcy and district
courts here. There, the Trustee filed
various claims against one of the banks
that had allegedly received some of the
15

motions to consolidate. Rather, Arnold
and Cutaiar devoted their energies to
priority claims, which, according to
Arnold, were the source of major
uncertainty concerning Mushroom’s
financial condition. Second, Arnold’s
inquiries to Ganz in February 1988 could
have led a reasonable trier of fact to
conclude that Arnold’s efforts went
beyond abdication of the debtor’s duty to
preserve the estate’s assets and in fact
constituted reasonable diligence for
purposes of the discovery rule. Finally, the
bankruptcy court’s two orders in June and
September 1987 provided Ganz with
nearly exclusive control over Mushroom’s
assets and removed any mechanism by
which the court could monitor use of those
funds. In the district court’s, a reasonable
fact-finder could find that a reasonably
diligent person in these circumstances
would have acted precisely as Mushroom
and its Trustee did here.

of administration.” Boldt v. United States
Trustee (In re Jenkins), 130 F.3d 1335,
1340 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). A fact-finder
could thus conclude that Mushroom’s
decision to entrust its lawyer, Ganz, with
the task of safeguarding its assets was
within the bounds of reasonableness.
Still further, the bankruptcy court
had issued two orders in June and
September of 1987 entrusting Mushroom’s
assets to Ganz. The June 1987 order
approved the Stipulation pursuant to which
Mushroom’s assets were to be turned over
to Ganz to hold in escrow. In Arnold’s
view, the June 1987 order prompted him to
believe that Mushroom’s assets were being
“invested in accordance with the special
rules applicable to bankruptcy.” The
September 1987 order granted Ganz’s
motion to excuse M ushroom from filing
operating reports otherwise required by the
Bankruptcy Code. In Arnold’s view, the
September 1987 order gave him “no
reason to expect that the absence of such
reporting indicated that a lawyer had
absconded with escrow funds... .” Just as
they in fact appeared to lead Arnold to
believe that the assets were safe and there
was no need to monitor them closely, these
orders could have led a reasonable person
to believe that there was no need to
monitor them on his or her own.

We find much of Judge Reed’s
analysis persuasive. First, the Bankruptcy
Code contemplates and encourages the
retention of professionals by debtors to
facilitate a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Section 327 states that “the trustee [and,
therefore, the debtor in possession], with
the court’s approval, may employ one or
more attorneys ... to represent or assist the
trustee in carrying out the trustee’s duties
under this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). The
Code also provides for the compensation
of such attorneys. 11 U.S.C. § 329. These
provisions reflect Congress’s desire “to
encourage trustees to delegate their duties
where such delegation would lower costs

In addition to these aspects of Judge
Reed’s analysis, and perhaps most
importantly, we find highly relevant the
fact that the genesis of this action is
Ganz’s abuse of his fiduciary, lawyerclient relationship with Mushroom, an
16

abuse which very well could have caused
Mushroom to relax its vigilance in
overseeing the execution of the duties it
delegated to Ganz. Neither Judge Robreno
nor Judge Reed expressly mentioned the
principle manifesting itself in decisions
from courts in this circuit (and numerous
other state and federal courts) that where
the wrongdoing underlying causes of
action has been perpetrated by a fiduciary
to the detriment of its principal, this fact
militates strongly against summary
judgment on the issue of whether the
principal (here Mushroom) exercised
reasonable diligence in failing to discover
the fiduciary’s malfeasance within the
applicable statutes of limitations.

is in prohibits the principal from
uncovering the fraud. Furthermore,
the fiduciary, because of his
position of trust, would have an
affirmative duty to the principal to
disclose the fraud.
Absent a
disclosure, the fiduciary commits
an act of continual covering up of
the fraud.
Id. at 403. The court noted that letters sent
by counsel for the creditors to the trustee
urging the trustee to investigate matters
pertaining to the purloined funds might
have imposed a duty to inquire upon the
trustee, but “whether or not the letters
imposed a duty upon the trustee to
investigate is a question of fact, which
must be resolved by a trier of fact.” Id.

Many judges in this Circuit have
recognized the impact of a fiduciary
relationship, and abuse of that relationship
by the fiduciary, on a discovery rule
analysis. In Schwartz v. Pierucci, 60 B.R.
397 (E.D. Pa. 1986), the trustee asserted
claims against a bank in an effort to
recover funds improperly drawn by
principals and officers of the debtor from
the debtor’s account at the bank. The
district court denied the bank’s motion for
su m m a ry judgment, rejecting its
contention that the statute of limitations
barred certain of the claims against it.
Specifically, the court found that the
officers’ wrongful conduct tolled the
applicable limitations period, reasoning
that:

The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania subsequently
addressed Schw artz in Gurfein v.
Sovereign Group, 826 F. Supp. 890 (E.D.
Pa. 1993).
Plaintiffs, investors and
partners in real estate limited partnerships,
brought fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and
related claims against some of their
general partners and related entities. In
response to defendants’ statute of
limitations defense, plaintiffs argued that
because defendants were plaintiffs’
fiduciaries, plaintiffs’ causes of action did
not accrue until they acquired actual
knowledge of their injury. The district
court found that we had not yet
“recognized an exception to the discovery
rule in the fiduciary-defendant context.”
Id. at 918. Nonetheless, he acknowledged
that “[t]he existence of a fiduciary
relationship is relevant to the question of

Where a fiduciary commits an act
of fraud against his principal, the
statute of limitations will be tolled,
since the very position the fiduciary
17

when a cause of action accrued. Because
of a fiduciary’s unique position of trust,
the presence of a fiduciary relationship
would be pertinent to the question of when
a plaintiff’s duty to investigate arose.” Id.
at 919 n. 31 (citing, inter alia, Schwartz).

To require a principal to engage in
aggressive oversight of its
fiduciary’s conduct is to deny the
very essence of a fiduciary
relationship.
Id. at 935 (citation omitted and first two
alterations and emphasis supplied) .10

The Eastern District recognized the
relevance of a fiduciary relationship to a
discovery rule/reasonable diligence
analysis in Rubin Quinn Moss Heaney &
Patterson, P.C. v. Kennel, 832 F. Supp.
922 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The plaintiff law
firm sued one of its partners who had
misappropriated client funds.
The
defendant asserted a limitations defense to
plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.
The district court held that the discovery
rule preserved the breach of fiduciary duty
claim largely because of the fiduciary
relationship existing between the firm and
its partners. The court concluded that:

10

The Eastern District is by no
means alone in subscribing to this view:
numerous courts have enunciated a similar
approach. See, e.g., Rieff v. Evans, 630
N.W.2d 278, 290 (Iowa 2001) (statute
tolled where plaintiff proves that “a
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists
between the person concealing the cause
of action and the aggrieved party,
combined with proof that defendant
breached the duty of disclosure”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Ray
v. Queen, 747 A.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C.
2000) (“In determining whether the
plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence,
the courts should consider, inter alia,
whether there was a fiduciary relationship
between the parties.”) (citation omitted);
Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645
(Tex. 1988) (“The client must feel free to
rely on his attorney’s advice. Facts which
might ordinarily require investigation
likely may not excite suspicion where a
fiduciary relationship is involved.”)
(citation omitted); Hobbs v. Bateman
Eichler, 210 Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (“W here a fiduciary
relationship exists, facts which ordinarily
require investigation may not incite
suspicion ... and do not give rise to a duty
of inquiry....”) (citations omitted). Other

Given Defendant’s position as a
fiduciary of the firm, and the
complexity of the real estate
transactions which gave rise to the
Real Estate Accounts, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff did exercise
due diligence in its oversight of
Defendant’s management of the
accounts. ... First as an employee,
and later as a partner, [Defendant]
sought and was accorded in return
the trust of [the firm’s] partners.
Ironically, it is this type of very
special relationship that enables a
wayward fiduciary to engage in
acts of concealment that “cause the
[principal] to relax vigilance or
deviate from the right of inquiry.”
18

We should stress that we do not
hold here that the existence of a fiduciary,
lawyer-client relationship between Ganz
and Mushroom, and Ganz’s abuse of that
relationship, alone preclude judgment as a
matter of law in PVHR’s and its
shareholders’ favor. 11 But as the district
court noted in Gurfein, “the presence of a
fiduciary relationship would be pertinent
to the question of when a plaintiff's duty to
investigate arose.” 826 F. Supp. at 919 n.
31 (citation omitted). Ganz was no
stranger to Mushroom and Arnold – he
was Mushroom’s lawyer, bound by
professional rules of ethics to the highest
duties of honesty and probity in his
dealings with his client. As the cases
discussed above illustrate, the existence of
a fiduciary relationship is relevant to a
discovery rule analysis precisely because it
entails such a presumptive level of trust in
the fiduciary by the principal that it may
take a “smoking gun” to excite searching

inquiry on the principal’s part into its
fiduciary’s behavior.
Here, Mushroom, through Arnold,
questioned Ganz directly concerning the
whereabouts of the transferred funds.
Arnold’s letter to Ganz set forth estimates
of Mushroom’s assets based on
Mushroom’s records and other numbers.
According to Arnold, Ganz responded to
Ganz’s letter “that the assets were invested
in passbook certificates of deposit at
various banks... .” Ganz himself testified
that he told Arnold that there was a certain
amount of assets under his supervision,
though he could not recall the exact
number he conveyed to Arnold.
We do not suggest that Arnold’s
inquiries should serve as a model of
vigilance for similarly situated debtors-inpossession. However, we believe that the
facts here – particularly the Bankruptcy
Code’s encouragement that debtors-inpossession retain lawyers and other
pr of e ssionals t o a s s ist in th e ir
reorganization, and the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship which Ganz
employed to conceal his defalcations at his
client’s (and its creditors’) expense –
create genuine factual issues for the factfinder concerning whether Arnold and
Mushroom exercised reasonable diligence
in uncovering Ganz’s embezzlement. 12

courts have gone even further in holding
that where there is a fiduciary relationship,
only the actual discovery of the
wrongdoing starts the running of the
limitations period. See, e.g., Community
Title Co. v. U.S. Title Guaranty Co., Inc.,
965 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(citations omitted).
11

At the same time, however, we
would not foreclose the possibility that in
some instances, the nature of a fiduciary
relationship might be such that the
relationship alone would be sufficient to
trigger application of the discovery rule.

12

The bankruptcy and district courts
found that laches barred the Trustee’s
turnover claim solely because the statute of
limitations on the analogous claim at law
under 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) had expired,
19

We therefore, with the exception of
Continental,13 will reverse the grant of
summary judgment in Appellees’ favor on
the non-ERISA claims and remand with
instructions to the district court to remand
the non-ERISA claims to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
D.

limitations and laches, Continental has
asserted numerous alternative grounds
supporting affirmance. Of course, we may
affirm the district court on grounds
different from those relied on by the
district court. Kabakjian v. United States,
267 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted). And we will affirm summary
judgment in Continental’s favor because
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fiduciaries Act
(“UFA”) immunizes Continental from any
liability flowing from its transfer of funds
to Ganz.

Is Continental entitled to summary
judgment on the alternative ground
that Pennsylvania’s Uniform
Fiduciaries Act shields it from
liability?

Continental bases its argument on §
6361 of the UFA, which provides that:

While PVHR and its shareholders
have advanced no arguments in support of
affirmance beyond the statutes of

A person who, in good faith, pays
or transfers to a fiduciary any
money or other property, which the
fiduciary as such is authorized to
receive, is not responsible for the
proper application thereof by the
fiduciary, and any right or title
acquired from the fiduciary in
consideration of such payment or
tr a nsfer is not inva lid in
consequence of a misapplication by
the fiduciary.

creating a presumption of inexcusable
delay and prejudice that the Trustee
presumably did not rebut. Because we
find here that the applicable statutes of
limitations have not expired as a matter of
law, we necessarily reverse the bankruptcy
and district courts’ conclusion that the
presumption of inexcusable delay and
prejudice had arisen as to Appellees’
laches defense, and remand as to laches as
well.

7 P.S. § 6361. A payment or transfer of
money “is done ‘in good faith,’ within the
meaning of this act, when it is in fact done
honestly, whether it be done negligently or
not.” Id. § 6351(2).

13

Because we conclude in the
following section that summary judgment
in Continental’s favor should be affirmed
on the alternative basis of the Pennsylvania
Uniform Fiduciaries Act’s immunity
provision, we decline to decide whether
the bankruptcy and district courts properly
granted sum mary jud gm ent in
Continental’s favor on the basis of the
statutes of limitations.

In the leading case on § 6361, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
a bank in virtually the same position as
Continental could not be liable on a breach
of contract theory.
See Robinson
Protective Alarm Co. v. Bolger & Picker,
20

516 A.2d 299 (Pa. 1986). There, a law
firm opened an escrow account in its name
on behalf of its client, Robinson Protective
Alarm. Three partners of the law firm
executed the signature card for the
account. One of these partners eventually
embezzled hundreds of thousands of
dollars from the account.
After
compensating Robinson for the embezzled
funds, the law firm brought an action for
indemnity or contribution against the bank.

to him will aid a breach of trust,
then the bank will be held to have
acted in “bad faith.”
Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
Applying this view, the court noted
that the embezzling lawyer was a fiduciary
as to the escrow funds in question, and was
empowered to receive them from the bank.
After setting forth the purpose of § 6361 –
“to facilitate banking transactions by
relieving a depositary of the responsibility
of seeing that an authorized fiduciary will
use entrusted funds for proper purposes” –
the court concluded that “[t]o apply a
theory which would hold a payor liable for
a minuscule and irrelevant departure from
the prescribed procedure, where he has
acted honestly in releasing money to a
known authorized fiduciary, without
knowledge of the latter’s intent to
subsequently embezzle those funds, would
clearly not contribute to the smooth flow
of commerce sought to be achieved by the
UFA.” Id. “Indeed,” the court continued,
“in the absence of contrary knowledge on
the depositary’s part, it [the bank] is
entitled, if not bound, to presume that a
fiduciary will properly apply funds
released to him.” Id. at 304-05 (citations
omitted).

The Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court both held that the bank, by
not obtaining endorsements prior to
redeeming certificates relating to the
account, had violated the redemption
provisions set forth on the certificates, and
had thereby committed a breach of
contract.
The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed, finding that § 6361
shielded the bank from liability because it
disbursed funds from the account to the
embezzling lawyer in good faith. The
court began its analysis by distinguishing
“good faith” in this context from “bad
faith”:
Even a failure to inquire under
suspicious circumstances will not
negate “good faith,” unless the
failure to do so is due to a
deli berate desire to eva de
knowledge because of a belief or
fear that inquiry would disclose a
vice or defect in the transaction.
Conversely, if a bank has
knowledge that a fiduciary intends
to appropriate trust funds to his
own use, and that to release funds

Here, the Trustee has not directed
us to any evidence in the record
demonstrating that Continental acted in
bad faith in transferring the funds to Ganz,
nor could we locate any on our own. The
Trustee does suggest, however, that
Continental is not entitled to the UFA’s
immunity because only PVHR itself, not
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Ganz, was authorized to receive the
transferred funds. Section 6361 requires
that the transfer at issue be made to a
fiduciary who “as such is authorized to
receive” the transfer before one can be
immunized from liability for making the
transfer. Continental naturally contends
that “Ganz was a fiduciary authorized to
receive the funds at issue[,]” pointing to
admissions in the complaints that “at the
time of the transfer of the funds, Ganz was
a member of PVHR and acted as legal
representative of M ushroom.” Moreover,
Continental continues, “it is undisputed
that Ganz was the only signatory on behalf
of PVHR on the Stipulation and signed as
counsel of record for Mushroom.”

“Pennsylvania courts define apparent
authority as that authority which, although
not actually granted, the principal
knowingly permits the agent to exercise, or
holds him out as possessing.” D & G
Equip. Co., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of
Greencastle, 764 F.2d 950, 954 (3d Cir.
1985) (citing, inter alia, Revere Press, Inc.
v. Blumberg, 246 A.2d 407, 410 (Pa.
1968)). “Apparent authority can exist only
to the extent that it is reasonable for the
third party dealing with the agent to
believe the agent is authorized.” Id. at 954
(citation omitted).
“The test for
determining whether an agent possesses
apparent authority is whether ‘a man of
ordinary prude nce, d iligence and
discretion would have a right to believe
and would actually believe that the agent
possessed the authority he purported to
exercise.’” Universal Computer Systems,
Inc. v. Medical Svcs. Ass’n of Pa., 628
F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1980) (citation
omitted).

The Stipulation required that the
escrow funds be turned over “to Debtor’s
counsel, Pincus, Verlin, Hahn & Reich,
P.C., to be held in escrow for the benefit of
the Debtor’s estate....” The issue for us is
whether this fact – that the Stipulation
required Continental to turn the escrow
funds over to PVHR, and not Ganz
specifically – precludes affirmance on this
alternative basis because it creates a
genuine issue of material fact concerning
the applicability of § 6361.

We find that the actions of PVHR –
holding Ganz out as one of the firm’s

receive the funds on PVHR’s behalf. See
Volunteer Fire Co. of New Buffalo v.
Hilltop Oil Co., 602 A.2d 1348, 1351-52
(Pa. Super. 1992) (noting that acts of agent
can bind principal upon showing of
“express authority directly granted by the
principal to bind the principal as to certain
matters [ ] or implied authority to bind the
principal to those acts of the agent that are
necessary, proper and usual in the exercise
of the agent’s express authority”) (citation
omitted).

We conclude that the undisputed
facts of record demonstrate as a matter of
law that Ganz was authorized to receive
the funds within the meaning of § 6361
because, as an agent of PVHR, he had at
least apparent authority to do so.14

14

Indeed, a strong case could be
made that Ganz had actual authority to
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bankruptcy lawyers and permitting him to
handle Mushroom’s bankruptcy – would
have led an ordinarily prudent bank in
Continental’s position to “have a right to
believe and [ ] actually believe that [Ganz]
possessed the authority” to receive the
transferred funds on PVHR’s behalf.
Ganz himself signed the Stipulation on
behalf of PVHR, giving Continental even
more reason to believe that Ganz had
apparent authority to receive funds
pursuant to the Stipulation. Thus, by
transferring the funds to Ganz, Continental
transferred the funds to one authorized to
receive them within the meaning of §
6361.

WL 96006, at *2 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24,
1999) (breach of contract, breach of
f id u c ia r y d u t y a n d n e g l ig e n c e ).
Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of
summary judgment in Continental’s favor
on all of the Trustee’s non-ERISA claims15
against it.
E.

Are Continental and PVHR
fiduciaries within the meaning of
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) so as to
be susceptible to Appellants’
breach of fiduciary duty claim
under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)?

Appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty
claim arises under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) of
ERISA, which creates liability for “[a]ny
person who is a fiduciary with respect to a
plan w ho br ea ch es an y of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a). A
person is a fiduciary of an ERISA plan to
the extent that such person “exercises any
discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such
plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of
its assets... .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).

The final issue is the scope of
immunity the UFA confers on Continental.
There is no question that Continental’s
allegedly wrongful transfer of funds to
Ganz forms the basis of the Trustee’s nonERISA claims against it. In Robinson
Protective Alarm, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is
nothing on the face of [§ 6361], or in any
other provision of the UFA, that would
restrict the immunity from liability to suits
based on negligence – or preclude its
applicability merely because a claim for
recovery rests on a contract theory.” 516
A.2d at 304. Following this dictate,
Pennsylvania courts have applied § 6361
to all manner of common law claims,
including, pertinently, breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion
claims. See id. (breach of contract); Jones
v. Van Norman, 522 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1987)
(conversion); Harris v. Police & Fire Fed.
Credit Union, No. Civ. A. 98-5175, 1999

The district court found that neither
Continental nor PVHR were fiduciaries
within the meaning of § 1002(21)(A)(i),
and therefore that § 1109(a) did not apply
to them. We concur. In Board of Trustees
of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 6
of New Jersey Welfare Fund v. Wettlin

15

The Trustee did not assert its
turnover claim against Continental.
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Assocs., Inc., 237 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001),
we made clear that one need not have
discretion in exercising authority or
control over the man agem ent or
disposition of plan assets in order to
qualify as a fiduciary under §
1002(21)(A)(i).
237 F.3d at 274.
Nonetheless, although we reversed the
district court’s grant of the defendantbank’s motion to dismiss because the
complaint had alleged the bank’s “day to
day responsibility to control, manage,
hold, safeguard, and account for the
Fund’s assets and income[,]” id. at 275
(internal quotation marks omitted), we
stated that we were “inclined to agree that
ERISA does not consider as a fiduciary an
entity such as a bank when it does no more
than receive deposits from a benefit fund
on which the fund can draw checks.” Id.
(emphasis supplied).

lead us to conclude that Continental was
not a fiduciary within the meaning of §
1002(21)(A)(i). We therefore will affirm
the grant of summary judgment in
Continental’s favor on Appellants’ breach
of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA.
We have not yet addressed whether
a law firm in PVHR’s position here
constitutes a § 1002(21)(A)(i) fiduciary.
Appellants have not alleged, nor does the
evidence establish, that PVHR had any
legal right or discretion to dispose of
Mushroom’s escrowed funds. Indeed,
Appellants’ amended complaint made
clear that the escrowed funds were to be
paid to the trustee on demand. The
Stipulation provides that PVHR’s role with
respect to the alleged “plan assets” (the
escrowed funds) was to hold them in
escrow for the benefit of the Mushroom
estate.

Neither the allegations nor the
evidence here suggest that Continental did
anything more than serve as the holder of
assets placed there pursuant to the
Stipulation.
Our dictum in Wettlin
Assocs., and the views of many of our
sister circuits, see Beddall v. State Street
Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 20 (1st
Cir. 1998) (“mechanical administrative
responsibilities (such as retaining the
assets and keeping a record of their value)
are insufficient to ground a claim of
fiduciary status”) (citations omitted);
Southern Council of Indus. Workers v.
Ford, 83 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1996)
(lawyer “did not become a plan fiduciary
merely by ... related control over the
settlement proceeds”) (citation omitted),

We agree with the bankruptcy and
district courts that in its role as holder of
Mushroom’s escrowed funds, PVHR
simply was not a fiduciary within the
meaning of § 1002(21)(A)(i). As noted
above, many of our sister circuits have
held that mere custody or possession over
plan assets, without more, does not render
one a fiduciary. Beddall, 137 F.3d at 20;
Southern Council of Indus. Workers, 83
F.3d at 968-69. Moreover, imposing
ERISA fiduciary duties to the Pension Plan
Plaintiffs where PVHR already had clearly
d e f i n e d f i d u c ia r y d u t ie s u n d e r
Pennsylvania law to both the debtor and all
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of the debtor’s creditors 16 would place
PVHR in a potentially conflicted position.
Southern Council of Indus. Workers, 83
F.3d at 969 (recognizing potential
“irreconcilable obligations” if ERISA
fiduciary duties to plan imposed on
insurance company with fiduciary duties to
its shareholders and clients) (citation
omitted); Chapman v. Klemick, 3 F.3d
1508, 1511 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
potential conflict betw een ER ISA
fiduciary duties imposed on bank and
bank’s fiduciary duties to shareholders and
customers). This potential conflict further
militates against finding PVHR to be a
fiduciary under ERISA. Accordingly, we
also will affirm the grant of summary
judgment in PVHR’s favor as to

Appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty claim
under ERISA.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will
reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of all Appellees except Continental
on the non-ERISA counts, and remand
with instructions to the district court to
remand the non-ERISA counts to the
bankruptcy court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion; we will affirm
the grant of summary judgment in
Continental’s favor on the non-ERISA
common law counts on the alternative
ground that the UFA immunizes
Continental from those counts; and we will
affirm the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Continental and PVHR on
Appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty
claims under ERISA.

16

As escrow agent and legal counsel
to Mushroom, PVHR had fiduciary duties
under Pennsylvania law to the entire
Mushroom estate, including the estate’s
creditors. Knoll v. Butler, 675 A.2d 1308,
1312 (Pa. Commw. 1996) (“An ordinary
escrow agreement creates a fiduciary
relationship between the agent [the
d e p o s i t o r y i n s ti t u ti o n ] a n d t h e
transferor.”); Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper,
Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1283
(Pa. 1992) (“Our common law imposes on
attorneys the status of fiduciaries vis a vis
their clients[.]”). Further, the Bankruptcy
Code forbids counsel to the estate from
holding any interest adverse to the estate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). Continental also
had fiduciary duties to the estate as an
escrow agent, so the potential conflict
rationale applies equally to it.

________________________
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